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July, 2008 
Jackpot Justice and the American Tort System: 
Thinking Beyond Junk Science 
Tom Baker, Herbert Kritzer and Neil Vidmar 
In 2007 the Pacific Research Institute1 released a report, Jackpot Justice: The True Cost of America’s 
Tort System, that is widely available on the internet.2 The conclusion of the report is that America’s tort 
system costs $865.37 billion annually, amounting to an “annual price tag, or ‘tort tax’ for a family of four in 
terms of costs and foregone benefits” of $9,827.  As our report will demonstrate, the conclusions of Jackpot 
Justice are without scientific merit and present a very misleading picture of the American tort system 
and its costs.3  
Research on the tort system’s efficiency, its fairness and other issues are legitimate topics of 
empirical inquiry and are to be encouraged. Indeed, the three authors of this report have collectively 
devoted many years to empirical investigation of the tort system. (Summary biographies of the authors 
appear at the end of this report.) However, when research findings, such as those in Jackpot Justice, are 
disseminated to the public and are intended to have effects on legislative and other public policy 
institutions, they deserve careful scrutiny, including close examination of the validity of the theoretical 
underpinnings, the methodologies used, the quality of the data reported, and the conclusions that are 
drawn from the analyses.  Scrutiny of Jackpot Justice in this way reveals many flaws that strongly contradict 
the conclusions that the Pacific Research Institute authors have made. 
Our report has four sections.  In Section I we draw attention to Jackpot Justice’s misleading 
claims about its scientific approach to the data and the claimed scholarly consensus that underlies their 
research. In section II we present a detailed critique of their analyses and conclusions. In Section III we 
address a missing part of the equation that Jackpot Justice uses to speculate about the “tort tax”: the cost 
of torts to victims. The analyses we present in this section are simply illustrative of the kind of data that 
would be needed to assess the costs and benefits of the tort system. We do not claim that our rough 
estimates are accurate, but they help to point to the reasoning flaws in Jackpot Justice.  In section IV we 
offer examples that are intended to counter general public misperceptions of three topics that are 
central targets of those who argue the tort system is unfair: medical malpractice litigation, products 
liability, and punitive damages. These examples are intended to put a concrete face on some of the 
technical issues discussed in the preceding sections of our report. 
A central message of our report is that the tort system needs to be viewed in terms of its benefits as 
well as its costs. Moreover, our report draws attention to the social and political choices involved in policies 
directed toward the goals of promoting responsibility, preventing injuries and compensating victims of 
negligence. We do not contend that the American tort system is flawless. But it is important to be aware 
that the corporate critics of the tort system frequently use the same tort system in their disputes with other 
businesses.  
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If you only assess the costs 
and not the benefits, how 
can you assess the merits of 
the tort system?  
I. Misleading Claims and Assertions
A. Half a “Theory”
Jackpot Justice begins by asserting its goal:  
…to arrive at a fuller accounting of the true cost of the U.S. tort liability system. 
The study provides a conservative first approximation of the total costs, both 
direct and indirect, and the total excess costs of the tort system4 
A key insight is the reference to “excess costs” contained in the above statement. The researchers began 
with an assumption that there would be excess costs, rather than taking a scientifically neutral position 
which would test if there were excess costs. To be sure, the report subsequently concedes that “[a] thriving 
free-enterprise economy depends on an efficient tort system that provides proper incentives to businesses 
to produce safe products in a safe environment and ensures that truly injured people are fully compensated 
for their injuries.”5  Yet, in almost the same breath the report 
concedes that the authors “do not explore the benefits [of the tort 
system], of which there are many.” (emphasis added).6  Instead they 
focus on the tort system as a “massive transfer system” that takes 
from businesses and gives to individuals, without considering if 
those individuals are deserving of compensation or if business fails 
to compensate large numbers of individuals whom they injure. 
Thus, from the very outset the research was fatally flawed: it started with a clear agenda and made 
assumptions and decisions that would advance that agenda. Stating the problem baldly, if you only assess 
the costs and not the benefits, how can you assess the merits of the tort system? Clearly, the only logical 
conclusion is that the authors did not want to present a balanced picture. 
B. Advocacy Disguised as Science
The authors of the report make the claim that their analysis represents a scholarly, consensus 
view.  They describe Jackpot Justice as a “fuller account of the true cost of the U.S. tort liability system” that 
is based on “scholarly studies by top economists and legal scholars,” that reflects a “consensus view on those 
who have studied these factors,” and that is based on “statistically significant results in the most prestigious 
academic publications.”7   
In reality Jackpot Justice presents neither the true cost of the U.S. tort liability system nor a 
consensus view.  Not one of the numbers included in the table of tort costs in the report comes from a 
“prestigious academic publication” or was subject to peer review by independent experts.  Most of the 
report's numbers rest on insurance industry-supported studies, particularly reports from Tillinghast 
Towers Perrin, an industry-focused organization whose data are not available for independent public 
evaluation of their validity and reliability.  With one minor exception, the rest of the studies are extreme 
extrapolations from dated scholarly studies that, taken on their own merits, plainly do not support the 
Jackpot Justice conclusions.   
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Once an injury happens, someone bears 
the costs, and if compensation is not 
provided through tort (or some other 
mechanism) then the injured person bears 
those costs, with some help from his or her 
health insurer (which in many cases is the 
taxpayer through governmental programs 
such as Medicare or Medicaid). 
Consider just one example. In Chapter 1 the report states: “Civil courts also give awards to 
individuals who have not suffered actual injuries and are thus not deserving of compensation.”8 The single 
source for this sweeping comment is to an unpublished Pacific Research Institute paper that deals with 
California’s worker’s compensation system.9 Worker’s compensation schemes are not part of the tort system. 
No other source is cited.  
II: Technical Analysis of PRI’s Jackpot Justice Report 
In this part of our response, we engage in a technical analysis of PRI’s Jackpot Justice report that 
will demonstrate that the method that PRI used to compute their “tort cost” number lacks scientific merit. 
Judge Richard Posner – a founding father of the economic analysis of law and a Reagan appointee to the 
United States Court of Appeals – put it best on the internet blog that he writes with the Nobel Prize 
winning economist Gary Becker.  Referring to Jackpot Justice’s bottom line, Judge Posner wrote, “The 
figure, however – the authors’ estimate of the net social loss created by our system – is, as I have tried to 
show, fictitious.”10   
In this rebuttal to Jackpot Justice we start from Judge Posner’s analysis, and go beyond it, to shed 
light on some major problems in the report that Judge Posner did not address.  At the start, it is very 
important to realize that, as Judge Posner pointed 
out, many of the items that the PRI report labels as 
“costs” are not true economic costs at all.  Indeed, 
one of their very large items represents an estimate 
of the total amount of money that the tort system 
transfers from people who caused harm to the 
people that they harmed.  Such transfers are one of 
the main goals of the tort system and are not a 
“social cost.”  Once an injury happens, someone 
bears the costs, and if compensation is not 
provided through tort (or some other mechanism) 
then the injured person bears those costs, with 
some help from his or her health insurer (which in many cases is the taxpayer through governmental 
programs such as Medicare or Medicaid).   
Jackpot Justice presents its tort cost estimate in the form of a table that appears at two places in the 
report.  The table divides the tort costs into two categories that we will analyze separately.  As we observed 
earlier, none of the numbers in that table come from peer-reviewed studies published in academic journals.  
Most of the numbers are derived from insurance industry reports that have not been subject to any 
independent review.  With one minor exception, the rest are highly dubious extrapolations from dated 
academic studies that were not designed for this purpose. 
A. Static Accounting Costs
About forty percent of the total of the PRI report's tort cost table – $327 billion – is in a category 
that PRI calls “static accounting costs.”  Despite the asserted academic and scholarly nature of the report's 
tort cost estimate, all of the numbers in the static accounting costs part of the table actually begin with a 
“tort cost” study produced by the insurance consulting company, Tillinghast Towers Perrin.   As Judge 
Posner noted “It is impossible to determine from Tillinghast Towers Perrin’s report what the sources for 
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…the Towers Perrin estimate was 
“almost certainly exaggerated, given 
the financial connection between the 
firm and the insurance industry.”
Without tort liability, firms would 
have weak incentives to invest in 
safety measures to benefit potential 
victims of the firms’ activities… 
most of its data are, and so the figures I have quoted must be taken with a grain of salt; indeed, so far as I 
can tell, they may be completely unreliable.”11  
There are at least the following problems with using the Towers Perrin numbers in this way.   
First, the Towers Perrin report includes the tort transfer payments to victims as part of the “costs” 
of the tort system.  As we have just explained, that is a fundamental error that greatly exaggerates the costs. 
Second, the Towers Perrin report has not been 
subject to the independent peer review that is one of the 
hallmarks of social scientific research published in 
academic journals.   
Third, the public data that Towers Perrin uses come from financial reports that insurance 
companies prepare to enable insurance regulators to assess the solvency of insurance companies, not to 
make the civil justice system transparent.  Because of the solvency objective, regulators deliberately 
designed the reporting system to require the insurance industry to err on the high side in estimating their 
future payments.  That way insurance regulators can be more confident that insurance companies will have 
the money that they need to pay claims in the future.  
Fourth, the solvency data present a snapshot of insurance costs that can be very misleading due to 
a unique insurance-industry specific business cycle called the underwriting cycle.12  Indeed, in preparing the 
Jackpot Justice report, the authors picked the year that represented the highest point in the cycle.  We 
explain the significance of their choice of years in a note, but the bottom line is that using the comparable 
figure from the most recent Towers Perrin report would cut the Jackpot Justice “static cost” number by 
more than ten percent.13  
Fifth, nearly one-third of the Towers Perrin tort costs are allocated to medical malpractice and 
self-insured costs, categories for which there are no reliable, publicly available data that provide a complete 
accounting. Towers Perrin estimated these costs using proprietary methods and data.14  
For these reasons, Judge Posner was surely correct in concluding that the Towers Perrin estimate 
was “almost certainly exaggerated, given the financial connection between the firm and the insurance 
industry.”15 
The Jackpot Justice authors then massaged the Towers Perrin number in a variety of questionable 
ways that appear designed to produce an even larger estimate of “static costs” than the estimate of tort costs 
in the Towers Perrin report.  The details of the massaging are somewhat technical, but the central problem 
is triple counting.   
The Jackpot Justice authors first identify the 
transfer payment component of the Towers Perrin 
number – i.e. the amount of money that, according to 
Towers Perrin, gets paid to victims.  That number is 
$128 billion.  Drawing on tax literature, they then 
simply assume that nearly 30% of that amount is a 
“deadweight loss” to society and therefore add $36 
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billion to the static cost table.   
It is important to emphasize that the authors really do simply assume this number.  There is no 
empirical support whatsoever for making this deadweight loss calculation in the tort context, and nowhere 
do the authors explain why this kind of transfer functions as a tax. Under their rationale, many routine 
business costs could arguably function in a similar fashion. Judge Posner explained the problem very well: 
[The authors of Jackpot Justice] base this [calculation] on a study which found that 
increasing the corporate tax rate by $1 generates 28 cents in deadweight costs. The 
basis of that finding was that a tax, like a monopoly markup, causes the taxpayer, 
like a consumer, to substitute for the taxed item or activity something that may cost 
society more to provide but looks cheaper because it's untaxed, or taxed at a lower 
rate. The authors of Jackpot Justice do not explain why a tort transfer would have the 
same effect. Of course, the threat of tort liability might well alter the behavior of 
potential injurers—indeed, it is intended to do so—but it might alter the behavior in 
a direction of greater efficiency, by making the potential injurers internalize accident 
costs. That is the objective of tort law, though imperfectly achieved. Without tort 
liability, firms would have weak incentives to invest in safety measures to benefit 
potential victims of the firms' activities, unless the victims were either their 
employees or their customers. 
The Jackpot Justice authors’ next step is, once again, to make an assumption.  This time they 
assume that plaintiffs will pay to obtain, and defendants will pay to avoid, the transfer payment in an 
amount that equals the transfer payment plus the deadweight loss.  This assumption – which is also 
without any empirical support in the tort context – results in an additional $164 billion in static costs.  
Finally, Jackpot Justice’s authors add the value of the transfers themselves to their tort cost table 
(while admitting in the text that transfer payments are not social costs) producing a total “static accounting 
cost” number of $328 billion: the assumed $36 billion, plus the assumed $164 billion, plus the transfer 
payments of $128 billion.  This is nearly three times as much as the questionable transfer payment number 
with which they started and even exceeds Towers Perrin’s exaggerated calculation of the costs of the tort 
system.     
B.  Dynamic Costs 
The other sixty percent of the costs in Jackpot Justice’s tort costs table – about $537 billion – is in a 
category that the authors call “dynamic costs.”  With one tiny exception, the numbers in this category 
represent highly inflated extrapolations from very dated academic studies that were not designed to 
generate estimates of this sort. 
Most of the “dynamic costs” fall in two categories:  defensive medicine (which they label “health 
care expenditures”) and social costs from lost sales of new products that the Jackpot Justice authors claim 
were not produced because of concern about liability.  For neither of these does the report does consider the 
positive effects of tort liability.  Tort liability is supposed to change behavior, to make medical procedures 
and products safer.  So the fact that doctors and manufacturers do things differently because of tort liability 
hardly proves that the tort system is wasteful.  
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Tort liability is supposed to change 
behavior, to make medical 
procedures and products safer.  
The defensive medicine number ($124 billion) in Jackpot Justice comes from a Price Waterhouse 
Coopers report that was funded by the health insurance industry as part of a Congressional lobbying 
campaign.16 The Price Waterhouse Coopers report drew on a reputable, if dated, academic study that 
measured defensive medicine; but that study looked at expenditures for only one set of diseases and, thus, 
does not provide a sound basis for generalizing about defensive medicine. Later research by the same 
academic research team called their earlier conclusions into question.17  Of course, neither Jackpot Justice 
nor the health insurance industry report cited that later research. Instead, the health industry report simply 
generalized from the first study to assert, without any 
empirical or analytical support, that ten percent of the 
entire cost of health care in the U.S. is attributable to 
defensive medicine and medical liability payments.18  
The Jackpot Justice number for the social costs from lost sales of new products ($367.06 billion) 
comes from massaging the results of an even older academic study that was not designed to produce this 
kind of number.  On its face, a claim that there are $367 billion per year in lost sales due to fears of products 
liability borders on the absurd. The total manufacturing output of the United States is about $1.6 trillion 
per year,19 and the idea that estimated tort costs (from what turns out to be only 12 industries20) could lead 
to lost sales equal to about 23 percent of manufacturing output seems more than a little far-fetched. The 
details of their data massaging are technical, but the over-arching theme is making questionable 
assumptions that produce a very high number in situations in which other assumptions would be more 
reasonable. 
The authors of the study upon which this figure is supposedly based, Viscusi and Moore, 
examined a total of 186 industries to evaluate whether tort losses increased or inhibited innovation in 
different industries. Fully 175 of those industries had a bodily injury loss to sales ratio that predicted either 
no effect or a positive effect on research and development (R&D), suggesting that tort losses actually 
increased innovation and new product sales.   
We explain in a textbox how making just one very reasonable change in a central assumption 
made by the Jackpot Justice authors cuts the total amount of lost sales that they estimate by about two-
thirds. This does not mean that we accept their argument that the tort system produces a significant 
amount of lost sales.  Instead we offer this example to further demonstrate that the Jackpot Justice tort costs 
table is a house of cards. Moreover, and as noted above, Viscusi and Moore reported that for some 
significant number of industries, tort losses spurred product development and added to the industries' sales 
of new products. Yet, in line with their decision to ignore the benefits of the tort system, the authors of 
Jackpot Justice made no effort to quantify the increased sales that could be attributed to R&D spurred by 
tort losses. Given that 94 percent of industries fell below the range where tort losses might depress R&D, the 
more reasonable conclusion is that the overall net effect of tort losses on R&D is positive, if one is willing to 
assume that there are the kinds of effects the Jackpot Justice authors want us to believe there are. Finally, the 
authors never take into account that many of the supposed lost products would replace existing products on 
the market; the question is not what lost sales of the new products are but, rather, the net difference in sales 
between the new products and those they replace.  
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In deriving an estimate of the supposed impact of "excess tort liability" on lost sales of new 
products, the authors draw on a study by Viscusi and Moore.1 Through a set of questionable assumptions, 
the authors arrive at a figure of $325 billion in lost sale in 2002 dollars (which adjusting for inflation 
becomes $367 billion in 2006 dollars). 
Viscusi and Moore's analysis examined 186 industries. For only 11 of these 186 industries did 
their analysis suggest that tort liability might be suppressing R&D expenditures. More specifically, Viscusi 
and Moore reported that a maximum expenditure on R&D occurs at a ratio of bodily injury losses to sales 
of about 6 percent. Viscusi and Moore reported a specific figure for bodily injury losses to sales for only one 
industry, the composition goods industry, which includes asbestos; for that industry, Viscusi and Moore 
reported a ratio of 14 percent. Viscusi and Moore describe a second industry, miscellaneous chemical 
products, as having "a high liability cost,” but give no figure for this industry. For the other industries, 
which they list, Viscusi and Moore described them as "at or near the turning point for one or more of the 
liability variables." "At or near" is the relevant phrase. 
What do the authors of Jackpot Justice do with these figures?  They arrive at a lost sales figure of 
about $5.5 billion for the composition goods industry. From other sources, they obtained a baseline for 
estimating lost sales totaling about $14.4 billion for two industries not among Viscusi and Moore's original 
11. So where did the remaining $305 billion come from? The Jackpot Justice authors made the assumption 
that the bodily injury losses to sales ratio for the remaining industries was 10 percent, an assumption they 
justify because it is the midpoint between the six percent where there is neither a positive or negative effect 
and the 14 percent experienced by the composition goods industry. Is 10 percent what Viscusi and Moore 
meant by "at or near" the turning point? That is very unlikely. At or near probably ranged between six (at) 
and eight (near) the six percent figure. 
Assuming the general rationale of the Jackpot Justice authors concerning lost product sales has at 
least some validity [an assumption we make here only for the sake of argument], the figure that more 
likely represents "at or near" would be an average of seven percent. Using this instead of the author's 10 
percent for industries other than composition goods, miscellaneous chemical products (we retain the 
Jackpot Justice  authors’ 10% figure for this industry), miscellaneous manufacturing, and apparel and 
other textile products, reduces the $305 billion figure to approximately $91 billion, which when added to 
the figures for the other four industries produces a total of about $111 billion, a far cry from the authors' 
$325 billion, and we have not examined any of the other dubious assumptions that the authors make in 
their calculation process. 
An equally telling critique comes from Judge Posner, who pointed out that the Jackpot Justice 
authors made a fundamental mistake by using the lost sales revenue from a product as the basis for 
calculating the alleged social cost of not producing the product.  In the first place, since the product was not 
produced because of a concern about liability, there is a good chance that the product would have been 
unsafe and, therefore, the social impact of not producing the product would be positive, not negative.  
Second, even if the product was not unsafe, lost sales revenue is not the measure of the social welfare that 
results from not producing the product.  The social welfare that comes from producing a product is the 
difference between what it costs to produce the product and the amount that people are willing to pay for it, 
as Judge Posner explained.   
The Jackpot Justice authors’ response to Judge Posner’s critique can only be described as bizarre.  
They first acknowledged that Judge Posner was right about the meaning of social cost.  They then explained 
that lost sales revenue could nevertheless be a reasonable measure of the social cost, as long as people are 
generally willing to pay twice the price of a product.  This is a true statement, but there is absolutely no 
reason to believe that people in fact would be willing (and able) to pay twice the sales price for all of the 
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products that they consume! Yet, as those authors' response to Judge Posner makes clear, the measure of 
“dynamic costs” in the report's tort costs table depends on just that assumption.21 
C. Excess Tort Costs 
To their credit, the authors of Jackpot Justice do not claim that all of what they label tort costs are 
unwarranted. Rather in the end they want to make claims about what constitutes excess tort costs in the U.S.  
How then did they arrive at an estimate of "excess tort costs"? They turned again to Tillinghast-
Towers Perrin data and a 2002 report showing tort costs as a percentage of GDP in eleven industrialized 
countries. The Jackpot Justice authors averaged the figures for the ten countries other than the United 
States, and obtain a figure of 0.9 percent of GDP. They then proceeded to assert that the difference between 
this average percentage and the American percentage of 2.2 percent of GDP constitutes "excess tort costs."22 
In other words, 59 percent of U.S. tort costs, according to these authors, are "excess."  
First, there is little or no information to assess the validity of the Tillinghast Towers Perrin 
numbers for the ten other industrialized nations. The 2002 report from which the numbers are taken 
provides no source information or any information on how the numbers were arrived at. Assuming they 
were generated in some way by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin they probably have all the problems previously 
described. 
Second, did the Jackpot Justice authors ever consider whether tort costs in other countries might 
differ from the U.S. because of factors that might explain why such costs are higher in the U.S.? Not 
surprisingly, the answer to this question is "no." We can identify at least three reasons why tort costs in 
other industrialized countries might be lower than in the U.S.: 
1. Other countries have stronger regulatory mechanisms that eliminate the need for some types 
of tort claims, either by reducing injuries or by redirecting concerns about products out of the 
tort system. 
2. Social welfare systems in other countries may reduce the need to rely upon tort claims for 
support and compensation after injury. 
3. Tort claims are driven heavily by medical costs, and the cost of health care is much higher in 
the U.S. than it is in other countries. 
It is difficult to quantify the first two of these, but we can roughly quantify the third, differences in health 
care costs using data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development on health care 
expenditures per capita measured in U.S. purchasing power for 2005.23 The U.S. per capita expenditure is 
$6,401; the average for the other ten countries used by the Jackpot Justice authors for comparison of tort 
costs was $2,816.24 Using these figures, per capita health costs in the U.S. are 2.27 times the per capita health 
costs in the ten comparison countries, about the same factor by which the U.S. tort costs exceed the average 
of tort costs in the ten countries as computed by Towers Perrin (2.44).  In other words, assuming that the 
Tillinghast Towers Perrin figures for the ten other countries are correct – itself a big assumption – the 
difference between the average for those 10 countries and the United States could be explained solely by the 
much higher cost of health care in the U.S., without any consideration of the differences in the operation of 
the tort system of the U.S. compared to the other countries. 
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D. Summary of Technical Analysis 
For all the reasons that Judge Posner identified, plus the additional information we provided about 
the Tillinghast Towers Perrin reports and the Jackpot Justice author's dynamic cost numbers, the tort cost 
number in their report is pure fiction. The numbers rest on insurance industry reports, questionable 
assumptions, and highly dubious extrapolations from a small number of academic empirical studies. 
Moreover, the Jackpot Justice authors' labeling of some portion of tort costs as "excessive" rests on 
assumptions that cannot be supported by even a very simple analysis of their calculations. 
 
III.  The Missing Costs of Torts to Victims 
The authors of Jackpot Justice eschew any effort to measure the cost of torts to victims in the 
United States. However, without considering those costs, one is ignoring the central question of whether 
the existing system actually is failing to do enough when it comes to compensating persons who are the 
victim of someone else's actions.25 While we are not in a position to generate a comprehensive measure of 
these costs, we did consider what might go into such a measure. The result is what might best be described 
as a first approximation, or a very crude, estimate of the costs inflicted on tort victims. We describe below 
in detail what we did to arrive at an estimate. As we will repeat at the end of this section, we do not view 
our estimate as something anyone should use; it is offered for illustrative purposes only.  
A good starting point, if one wants to estimate the cost of tort injuries to the victims, is a 1991 
study by the RAND Corporation on compensation for nonfatal accidental injuries (excluding injuries due 
to medical treatment).26  In their report from that study, the RAND researchers provide figures for what 
they label "direct costs" (medical costs) and earnings loss for each of three different types of accident 
settings: work, motor vehicle, and other. They note that their figures do not take into account losses 
associated with nonmarket activities (e.g., household tasks and the like) nor is there any consideration of 
noneconomic damages (pain and suffering). Of course many of the accidents do not involve torts. 
However, the RAND researchers asked whether the accident victims had considered filing a tort claim,27 
and we use the percentage considering a claim to adjust the gross figures in the RAND report. The original 
RAND figures are shown in Table 1 with a last line showing our estimate of the amount of loss, excluding 
nonmarket activities and pain and suffering, attributable to tort loss injuries.  
 
TABLE 1: ORIGINAL RAND ESTIMATES (In Billions) 
 work auto other 
Medical costs $31.5 $24.9 $41.5 
Lost income/wages $51.7 $12.1 $14.2 
% considered claiming 25% 54% 10% 
Costs attributable to Tort $20.8 $20.0 $5.6 
 
We next applied inflation adjusters to bring these figures up to 2006 dollars (the year used in 
Jackpot Justice). The medical cost index for 1988 was 138.6 and for 2006 336.2, giving a multiplier of 2.43. 
For income loss, we used Bureau of Labor Statistics wage data; the resulting multiplier is 1.79.28 Finally, we 
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adjusted for population growth (1988 population = 244.5 million; 2006 population = 299.4 million). Using 
these procedures, we arrive at a figure of $121.6 billion for the medical expense and lost wage components 
of the tort loss associated with nonfatal injuries other than medical malpractice, not counting the value of 
nonmarket activities.  
What about nonmarket costs, or what might be labeled "lost household production?" A recent 
study of loss associated with medical injuries estimated the overall cost of lost household production as 
roughly equal to the loss of market wages.29 We know of no reason that there should be a major difference 
in lost household production dependent on the source of the injury. Consequently, we had added an 
amount equal to the updated figure for lost wages based on the RAND data ($37.4 billion) to represent 
nonmarket losses (other than pain and suffering). This results in a total loss for nonfatal tortious injuries 
other than medical injuries of $158.9 billion. 
Next, we need to add in the costs associated with medical injuries attributable to negligence. A 
conservative estimate is that there are a million incidents of medical negligence each year and that 100,000 
of these result in death. Let us consider for now only the nonfatalities. Studdert et al. estimated that in 
Colorado and Utah the health care costs, lost wages, and lost household production associated with an 
estimated 4,007 "preventable adverse events" totaled $308.3 million in 1996 dollars.30 Their analysis 
included fatalities (8.8% of preventable adverse events) but excluded birth injuries.31 Unfortunately, 
Studdert et al. did not separate out the fatalities, and all we can do is guess at the proportion of the total 
costs came from that subset of cases. If we assume that half of the total loss was attributable to fatalities, we 
arrive at an average figure for non-fatalities of $54,220, after adjusting to 2006 dollars. Applying this to the 
approximately 900,000 nonfatal incidents nationwide, the total of costs associated these injuries (which we 
take to exclude birth injuries) is $48.8 billion. 
Next we need to estimate the number of, and costs associated with, preventable birth injuries. The 
best study focused on birth injuries is that described by Sloan et al.32 Based on a review of closed claims, 
they focused on 613 birth injuries over a five year period. They estimated the average total economic loss as 
$1.4 million per case, which when adjusted to 2006 dollars is $2.3 million. How many birth injuries 
occurred nationally? If one makes the very conservative assumption that all preventable birth injuries lead 
to claims, and that the rate of preventable birth injuries in Florida can be generalized nationally, there 
would have been about 1,850 injuries in 2006 (given the number of births that year). The total cost under 
this assumption would be $4.3 billion. If one makes the more realistic assumption that only a small fraction 
of such injuries lead to claims, say 25%, then the total cost would be $13.2 billion.33 
Finally, we need to add an estimate of the tort losses associated with fatalities. This is difficult, and 
requires us to assign some economic value to the average fatality. However, we will be transparent, which 
will allow alternate estimates. The first question is the number of fatalities. We obtained from Center for 
Disease Control the number of deaths due to accidents (motor vehicle: 44,000, work: 2,500, and other: 
50,000), and applied the same "claiming rate" percentages (see Table 1) to estimate the number of deaths 
due to torts. To this figure we added the estimated 100,000 fatalities resulting from medical negligence. This 
yielded a total of just under 130,000 deaths each year attributable to torts.  
One way to assign a dollar value to a death would be to determine the sum of the medical costs 
incurred from the injury before death, lost wages, and lost household production. This is essentially what 
Studdert et al did in their medical injury study in Colorado and in Utah, although, as noted previously, they 
did not separate out fatality cases. If our assumption that half of the costs of non-birth injury medical 
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negligence comes from the fatality cases, the average fatality case in the Colorado-Utah study had a loss of 
about $560,000. The method commonly used by economists is to impute a value to life by looking at the 
wage premium workers obtain as a function of the risk associated with various types of jobs. One economist 
who has written on this is W. Kip Viscusi (whom the authors of Jackpot Justice have looked to for figures 
for their analysis). Viscusi reports that the U.S. studies that have applied this method obtain estimates 
clustered in the range of $4 million to $10 million, with an average of about $7 million.34 Clearly, we have a 
wide range here, from about $500,000 to $4 million (using the lower end of the range reported by Viscusi), 
which yields estimates of the tort loss associated with fatalities ranging from $65 billion to $520 billion. For 
purposes of arriving at a total, we will use the figure of $1 million per life, which provides a conservative 
estimate. If one prefers the high figure of $4 million for loss of life, simply add $390 billion to our total. 
Combining our four figures, $158.9 billion for the medical expense, lost wages, and lost household 
production for nonfatal accidents other than medical malpractice, $48.8 billion for the medical expense and 
lost wage components of nonfatal medical negligence injuries other than birth injuries, $13.2 billion for 
birth injuries, and $130 billion for torts that resulted in fatalities, we arrive at a figure of $350.9 billion (or, 
$750 billion if one prefers the higher valuation for fatalities). Obviously we have made a number of 
debatable assumptions in reaching this figure. However, we have also not included anything noneconomic 
damages associated with nonfatal injuries.35   
We want to state again that we do not view this estimate as a reliable estimate of the cost of 
injuries and fatalities due to torts. We provide it simply to suggest that analysts seriously concerned 
about the costs associated with torts could have made some effort to consider the cost of torts from the 
victims' perspective. 
IV. The Tort System as a Financial Transfer System: Medical 
Malpractice, Products Liability, and Punitive Damages. 
Jackpot Justice refers to the tort system as a financial transfer system. In general terms we do not 
disagree, but it is a system that has demonstrable benefits for persons injured through negligence and for 
American taxpayers as well. It boils down to a public policy decision about who should bear the costs of 
negligence. Jackpot Justice takes aim at medical malpractice litigation as an example of the tort system gone 
awry so let us begin by considering some of the costs associated with medical negligence.  We also address 
their two other main targets – products liability and punitive damages. 
 
A. The Example of Medical Malpractice 
Medical Negligence is Not Infrequent 
The 1990 Harvard study of medical negligence examined hospital records of 31,000 patients and 
concluded that one out of every 100 patients admitted to hospital had an actionable legal claim based on 
medical negligence.36 Significantly, seven of those ten persons suffered a permanent disability. Fourteen 
percent of the time the adverse event resulted in death and ten percent of the time the incident resulted in 
hospitalization for more than six months. Generally, the more serious the injury the more likely it was 
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caused by negligence.37  Subsequent research involving Utah and Colorado found rates of negligent adverse 
events that were similar to the New York findings.38 
In 2000, The Institute of Medicine produced a report that relied on these studies and other data.39 
The report concluded that each year 98,000 persons die due to medical negligence and that many other 
patients sustain serious injuries. There are reasons to believe that this report may have underestimated the 
incidence of medical negligence because the studies it used were based solely on hospital records.40 In 2004, 
Healthgrades, Inc., a company that rates hospitals on health care for insurance companies and health plans, 
concluded that the Institute of Medicine’s figure of 98,000 deaths was too low and that a better estimate was 
195,000 annual deaths.41 In short, there is no serious question that medical negligence not only occurs, but 
that it occurs at a substantial rate. 
Injuries Due to Medical Negligence Have High Costs 
As we described earlier, Professors Sloan and van Wert conducted systematic assessments of 
economic losses (medical costs, income losses, and other expenses) in Florida cases involving claims of 
medical negligence occurring as a result of birth-related incidents.42 Even though those researchers offered 
the caution that their assessment procedures probably underestimated losses, they found that severely 
injured children’s economic losses were, on average, between $1.4 and $1.6 million in 1989 dollars. If 
adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index these figures in 2006 dollars translate roughly to $2.3 
million per injury. In the same study the losses of persons who survived an emergency room incident were 
estimated at $1.3 million, or $2.3 million in 2006 dollars. For persons who died in an emergency room 
incident the loss to their survivors was estimated at $0.5 million, or roughly $0.8 million in today’s dollars.43 
Most Negligently Injured Patients Do Not Sue 
The Harvard study of medical negligence found that one of every 100 patients admitted to hospital 
had an actionable legal claim based on medical negligence. Yet only about one in eight filed a claim.44 
Subsequent research replicated that finding. Research by Lori Andrews found that of 1,047 patients who 
experienced a medical error, only thirteen patients made a claim.45 Sloan and Hsieh studied 220 childbirths 
in Florida that involved death or permanent injury to the infant and had the medical records reviewed by 
independent medical experts.46 Only 23 of the 220 parents sought legal advice and these tended to be cases 
in which the child suffered very serious injuries and in which the reviewing doctors concluded that 
negligence was probably involved. Yet, not a single lawsuit was filed in any of the 220 cases.   
There are many reasons that injured patients do not file lawsuits. Among the reasons are that they 
never learn that the bad outcome was due to negligence; they assume that the doctor was trying hard; and 
they cannot find a lawyer willing to take their case because it is too difficult or too expensive to litigate.47    
Who Pays for the Medical Malpractice Loss? A Hypothetical Example 
Assume John Worker, age 35, is making $40,000 per year in his construction job. He has a wife 
and two young children.48 His total assets include $10,000 in savings and $15,000 equity in his home. Like 
millions of Americans he cannot afford health insurance. During medical treatment for a benign tumor, 
Mr. Worker incurred a serious injury due to medical negligence that required six months of hospitalization. 
Despite his eventual recovery, the injury prevents him from working for the rest of his life. He has partial 
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At a Congressional hearing in 2003 a seventeen-year–old teenager, courageously 
testified about her psychological pain as a result of egregious medical malpractice when she 
was eight years old that has left her face permanently and horribly disfigured. 1 Among other 
side effects, she is subject to constant drooling. She described how other children made fun of 
her as she advanced through her teenage years. She had had one self-initiated date and it was 
a disaster. She told about her belief that she will never marry and have children and will have 
to concentrate on a career raising and training dogs because they do not discriminate on the 
basis of human appearances. Unfortunately, despite her apparent intelligence and warm 
personality and the unfairness of her condition, Heather was probably right. The audience, 
including the congressmen, was wiping tears as they listened to her testimony. If Heather lives 
to be 78 years old, an award of $250,000—the limit for non-economic damages in many tort 
reform packages—would mean she would be compensated at the rate of $3,571 per year or 
$68.60 per week for her shattered life--–not enough to buy a decent bag of groceries.   
In North Carolina, a young mother of two children was rendered permanently blind.1  
In other cases patients lost sexual or reproductive functions, injuries that were very real but the 
losses could not be easily calculated like medical expenses or loss of income. In still other cases 
payments have been made through the tort system to orphaned infant children as a result of 
medical negligence that killed their mother.1  
paralysis on right side of his body and chronic pain that is severe enough to frequently require strong 
painkillers. The uncontested economic losses (even without adjustments for inflation) are as follows: 
a. Past medical bills (intensive care and rehabilitation): $300,000 
b. Future medical bills resulting from injury at $15,000/year for his life 
expectancy of 39 years to age 74: $585,000 
c. Past income loss during year of recovery: $ 40,000 
d. Future income loss to age 65 at $40,000/year:   $1,200,000 
e. Total economic losses: $2,125,00049 
Because he has no health or other insurance, his state’s Medicaid system will probably pick up the medical 
bills. Unless his wife gets a better job or relatives help out, the family may also have to rely on welfare.  
And here is the transfer issue. Medicaid, Medicare and welfare programs are funded by American 
taxpayers. The cost of Mr. Worker’s injury will be born by taxpayers, not by the party that was negligent. 
This is a transfer tax is totally ignored in the theorizing of the Jackpot Justice authors. Alternatively, 
however, Mr. Worker may file a lawsuit. If he is successful against the negligent healthcare provider, 
taxpayers will not be forced to bear the costs. Moreover, even if Medicaid pays for his medical bills while the 
lawsuit is in progress, Medicaid is required to file a lien against any settlement or award that results from 
the lawsuit in order to reimburse the taxpayers. In short, taxpayers benefit from the transfer effects of the 
tort system. 
Pain and Suffering 
Tort critics constantly denigrate pain and suffering payments with snide suggestions that such 
awards are unmerited. We have already drawn attention to the allegation in Jackpot Justice: “of every dollar 
paid by defendants with the claim that twenty-four cents of every tort dollar goes for “non-economic 
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payments, including punitive damages.” Put the punitive damages aside for now, because punitive damages 
are seldom given in medical malpractice cases,50 and consider two responses to this assertion. The first is 
that American law has long recognized pain and suffering as a legitimate component of damages. The 
second is that most plaintiffs ultimately receive proportionately little or nothing for pain and suffering.  
Medical malpractice settlements, whether they occur before trial or after a jury verdict, actually 
yield little beyond partial compensation for loss of income and medical expenses. In their study of birth and 
emergency room injury awards, Professor Sloan and his colleagues compared the plaintiffs’ economic losses 
to the amount actually received.51 On average, in cases that were settled prior to trial, plaintiffs received only 
52 percent of their losses. Plaintiffs in cases that went to trial did better than plaintiffs in settled cases, 
ultimately receiving 22 percent more than their estimated economic losses.52 Patients with the most severe 
injuries were least likely to receive adequate compensation.53 After conducting their detailed analyses Sloan 
and co-authors concluded that: 
few claimants received payments far above the mean for their stage of 
resolution categories.  The fact that even plaintiffs who were successful at 
verdict received payments only moderately higher than economic loss 
contradicts the notion that courts make very excessive awards in medical 
malpractice cases.54 
Summary on Medical Malpractice 
Medical malpractice litigation serves as a vehicle for thinking about the costs of injuries and who 
should pay. To be sure, the tort system is not perfect. Many injured persons do not make claims and of 
necessity taxpayers bear the burden. Even when claims are filed, both sides bear substantial transaction 
costs. The problem is that Jackpot Justice does not even consider the enormous costs of medical negligence, 
let alone suggest an alternative system of compensation. Indeed, it is worth reiterating that, yes, the tort 
system is a wealth transfer system, but a competent theory should take into consideration costs and 
benefits; and clearly there are both benefits that accrue from the present system and enormous costs in 
terms of human lives and taxpayer dollars that need to be considered if it were drastically altered with no 
viable alternative system to replace it.  
B. The Products Liability Example  
Products liability is another central theme in Jackpot Justice. The claim is that fear of litigation 
stifles innovation, and lowers America’s competitive edge against manufacturers from foreign countries. 
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Tort Reform Association frequently report stories 
about “judicial hellholes” and stories about a tort system run amuck. One story on the internet and 
elsewhere tells of a man who purportedly injured himself while using his lawnmower as a hedge clipper, 
and then won $500,000 in a lawsuit against the lawnmower company. U.S. News and World Report told of a 
trial involving a woman who threw a soft drink at her boyfriend in a restaurant, slipped on the wet floor 
and then won $100,000 in a lawsuit against the restaurant. Forbes, The New York Times, and the Los Angeles 
Times have all carried the story about a woman who claimed to have lost her psychic powers after a C.A.T. 
scan and was awarded millions of dollars. The problem is that these stories are either total fabrications or 
great distortions of the facts of the lawsuit.55  
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The Actual Frequency of Product Liability Awards 
The best data on product liability trials comes from the Civil Justice Surveys of the U.S. Bureau of 
Justice Statistics. In 2001, a survey representative of the 75 largest counties in the United States uncovered 
the fact that there were a grand total of 144 product liability trials, 31 of which were about asbestos.56   
About 92 percent of product liability trials were jury trials. Plaintiffs prevailed over defendants in 
45 percent of the jury trials and 50 percent of trials that were decided by judge alone. In asbestos trials, the 
median award was $1,650,000, but it must be remembered that in asbestos cases there are often multiple 
plaintiffs who split the award. In other cases, which also sometimes involve more than one plaintiff, the 
median award was $311,000. Often the injuries suffered by plaintiffs in product liability trials are life 
crippling or death. Furthermore, what is striking given the complaints about punitive damages in these 
cases is the fact that in 2001 punitive damages were awarded in only three product liability cases in the 
Bureau of Justice Statistic’s sample of state courts, and two of those were in trials involving asbestos.  
The Bureau of Justice Statistics also gathered data on trials in federal courts nationwide for the 
period 2002-2003.57 There were 203 product liability trials in these federal courts, including two trials 
involving airplanes, five involving marine products, 27 involving motor vehicles and one involving 
asbestos. Plaintiffs won only one third of the trials. The median estimated award in all cases was $350,000. 
Furthermore, in some of these cases there were multiple plaintiffs involved in the lawsuit, a factor bearing 
on how much each individual plaintiff received from the total award.   
A large percentage of the costs in Jackpot Justice’s table of tort costs are attributable to products 
liability. Claims are often made that the numbers of product liability claims are increasing. The court 
statistics contradict these claims.58 The data about numbers and outcomes in the courts cover the period 
from 1990 through 2003. First consider asbestos trials. In 1990 there were 87 trials and plaintiffs were 
awarded damages in 38 of them. The year 1991 was the high point of asbestos trials. There were 271 trials 
and plaintiffs were awarded damages in 228 instances. The following year there were only 29 trials and the 
numbers dropped to single digits after that. In 2002 and 2003 there were no asbestos trials in federal courts 
in the United States. 
But what about non-asbestos product liability trials? In the federal courts in 1990 there were 279 
trials but that number has steadily dropped so that in 2000 there were 100 trials, 2001 saw 79 trials, 2002 
saw 107 trials and in 2003 there were only 87 trials. Across the period from 1990 through 2003 plaintiffs 
won approximately only one case in three.  
In short, reliable data show that product liability trials are much less frequent than claimed by 
advocates of tort reform and implied in Jackpot Justice. Also, the size of awards is much more modest than 
would be expected by the rhetoric against the tort system. The data also suggest that punitive damage 
awards in particular are infrequent. But let us examine them in more detail. 
C. The Punitive Damages Example 
Punitive damages awarded by juries in particular are a central theme in claims about product 
liability. Many stories about punitive damages have become urban legends passed around in printed form 
and on the internet.59  The most famous case in recent years is the McDonald’s coffee spill case in which a 
jury awarded the plaintiff, Stella Liebeck, several million dollars after she spilled hot coffee on herself at a 
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Most coffee in restaurants and home 
coffee makers is served at 160 degrees. 
McDonald’s coffee was served at 180 
to 190 degrees… 
McDonald’s had made a conscious 
decision to not warn its customers. 
McDonald’s drive through. The Liebeck case is a true case, but many people are unaware of the actual facts 
of the case that put the jury award in a different light. Professors William Halton and Michael McCann 
have reported the complete story.60 
In 1992 79-year-old Stella Liebeck ordered a cup of coffee at a McDonald’s drive-through in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico. The coffee spilled into her lap, causing third degree burns to her thighs, 
buttocks, genitals and groin areas that left permanent scars.  Mrs. Liebeck, a conservative Republican, sent a 
letter of grievance to McDonald’s corporate office 
acknowledging that she had spilled the coffee, but 
claimed there was no warning about the danger of the 
product. She asked McDonald’s to re-evaluate its coffee 
temperature and to check the coffee machine to 
determine if it was faulty, and pay her approximately 
$20,000 in medical expenses. In reply McDonald’s 
offered Mrs. Liebeck $800.00. 
Only then did Mrs. Liebeck consult a lawyer. The lawyer asked McDonald’s for $90,000 for her 
medical bills plus pain and suffering. McDonald’s refused and made no counter-offer. The case went before 
a mediator who recommended a settlement of $225,000. Again McDonald’s refused to negotiate a 
settlement. 
The case went to trial. Two medical experts testified about the effects of burns, including the fact 
that 190 degree coffee can cause third degree burns that penetrate  through the skin into the underlying fat, 
muscle and bone. Her lawyer charged that McDonald’s failed to comply with industry standards. Most 
coffee in restaurants and home coffee makers is served at 160 degrees. McDonald’s coffee was served at 180 
to 190 degrees. Other evidence produced at the trial showed that most customers were unaware of the 
hazards of such hot coffee.  McDonald’s had received over 
700 complaints about its coffee and had paid out over 
$750,000 in previous claims. Nevertheless McDonalds had 
never once consulted a burn specialist. Finally, a witness 
for McDonald’s admitted that he had seen photos of previous coffee burns from claimants and that 
McDonald’s had made a conscious decision to not warn its customers. He dismissed the dangers as being 
statistically irrelevant and testified that McDonald’s had no current plan to change its coffee standards.                                      
The jury found for Mrs. Liebeck and awarded her $200,000 for compensatory damages. However, 
it also found Mrs. Liebeck 20 percent responsible, which reduced the compensatory damages to $160,000. 
In arguing for punitive damages, Mrs. Liebeck’s lawyer noted that McDonald’s sold over a billion cups of 
coffee each year and generated daily revenues of $1.35 million.  He argued that two days worth of coffee 
revenues was a sufficient and reasonable punitive award. The jury agreed and awarded $2.7 million. 
Following the verdict the trial judge reviewed the evidence and reduced the punitive award to 
$480,000. McDonald’s appealed but eventually the case settled for an undisclosed sum. McDonald’s coffee 
is now sold at temperatures similar to other restaurants.  Despite the abuse heaped on Mrs. Liebeck’s case, 
McDonald’s customers are safer as a result today. 
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Punitive Damage Awards in Perspective 
Over the past thirty years respected research organizations, the federal government, and 
independent academic researchers have conducted a large number of studies examining jury awards in 
punitive damages cases.  In a recent case before the U.S. Supreme Court, twenty-four scholars who had 
worked in this field summarized the findings. The research has found that  
• Juries award punitive damages infrequently;  
• Punitive damages awards have not increased in frequency;  
• When adjustments are made for inflation the magnitude of such awards has not increased 
over the past several decades;  
• Most awards are modest in size, in comparison to compensatory awards;  
• The overwhelming majority of awards show a rational proportionality between actual and 
potential harm caused by defendants;  
• The same proportionality relationship between compensatory and punitive damages 
exists in cases involving large punitive awards;  
• Juries pay particular attention to the reprehensibility of defendants’ conduct;  
• Jury decision-making processes in punitive damages cases are similar to the decision-
making processes used by judges in bench trials of such cases;  
• The amounts of punitive awards rendered by juries and judges are similar when 
adjustments are made for case types;  
• No evidence shows juries are biased against large businesses;  
• Judges effectively exercise supervision over punitive damages in post-verdicts motions or 
on appeal; and 
• In other instances post-verdict settlements reduce or abandon punitive awards without 
judicial intervention.61 
Using data collected by the U.S.  Bureau of Justice and the National Center for State Courts 
Professor Eisenberg and his collaborators concluded as follows: 
 [T]his article shows a strong and statistically significant correlation between 
compensatory and punitive damages. . . .  In addition we find no evidence that 
punitive damages awards are more likely when individuals sue businesses than when 
individuals sue individuals.  With respect to award frequency, juries rarely award 
punitive damages and appear to be especially reluctant to do so in the areas of law 
that have captured the most attention, products liability and medical malpractice.  
Punitive damages are most frequently awarded in business/contract cases and 
intentional tort cases.62 
The Purposes of and Legislative Support for Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages can be traced back many centuries in English law and were adopted very early 
into American law. At least 40 states specifically allow punitive damages.63 The purpose of punitive damages 
is to protect society from violations of public safety or public values. They are a sanction for behavior that is 
judged, wanton, reckless, or in disregard for the safety and well being of others. Some states refer to them as 
“exemplary damages” or “vindictive damages.” In most states punitive damages may not be given in 
medical malpractice cases unless the doctor has knowingly engaged in reprehensible behavior, such as 
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The purpose of punitive damages is to 
protect society from violations of public 
safety or public values. 
sexual assault on a patient or deliberate alteration of medical records. Moreover, while the plaintiff need 
only prove his or her case on “the preponderance of evidence,” to receive compensatory damages, punitive 
damages typically require a much higher standard of proof, namely “clear and convincing evidence.”64 
Although in recent years various state legislatures have voted to put restrictions on the conditions 
under which punitive damages may be awarded, they still are regarded as having an important role to play 
in response to egregious behavior. The U.S. Supreme 
Court, while expressing concerns about the amounts 
awarded and what juries may consider in rendering 
them, has acknowledged that punitive damages 
further legitimate societal goals of retribution and 
deterrence.65   
Business-Against-Business Disputes and Punitive Damages 
In an important book on the American tort system, Professors Thomas Koenig and Michael 
Rustad pointed out that the real action involving punitive damage lawsuits involves businesses suing other 
businesses.66 They occur frequently in trademark infringement cases and contract disputes; and on the 
surface many of them might be viewed as frivolous. Koenig and Rustad gave some examples:  
American Express settled a punitive damages case against Chase Manhattan Corporation 
over Chase’s print and mail advertisements, which praised its award earned from J.D. 
Power and Associates for its credit cards; 
Federal Express filed a lawsuit seeking treble damages over the U.S. Post Office’s “What’s 
Your Priority?” Advertising Campaign; 
The maker of Scott paper towels sued Proctor and Gamble over its claim that Bounty paper 
towels were the “quicker –picker- upper.” 
The frequency of business-to-business lawsuits involving punitive damages clearly undercuts the 
attacks by businesses against punitive damages. Punitive damages can only be given if the defendant’s 
behavior involves fraud or some other egregious behavior, and such claims can only be litigated under the 
tort system.  These business disputes often involve claims for very large damages.  Not only are large sums 
involved in the claims, they also entail batteries of lawyers on both sides and therefore huge litigation costs. 
It is the height of hypocrisy to claim that punitive damages are ruining the country when an injured person 
sues for punitive damages while ignoring the fact that large corporations regularly sue one another and 






What do these business punitive damages cases look like? Let’s consider a case that was 
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Here in a nutshell are the facts about TXO Production Corp 
v. Alliance Resources Corp.1 TXO, a large corporation, entered into an agreement with Alliance, a 
much smaller corporation, that involved transfer of oil and gas development rights to Alliance. 
TXO subsequently made a claim against those rights by advancing a worthless claim in an effort to 
renegotiate its royalty agreement with Alliance and obtain substantial royalties that were now due 
to Alliance. The jury concluded—and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed—that “TXO set out on a 
malicious and fraudulent course to win back, either in whole or in part, the lucrative stream of 
royalties that it had ceded to Alliance.” The jury awarded Alliance $19,000 in compensatory 
damages and $10 million in punitive damages. The case was appealed all the way to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which, after careful review, concluded that the award was justified. 
These business-against-business cases do not stand alone. Consider a partial sample of the 
so-called “blockbuster awards” discussed by Joni Hersch and Kip Viscusi in an article on punitive 
damages: Timely Adventures v. Costal Mart, Inc. (2000) for $100 million; Tennessee Gas Pipeline 
v. KCS Resources, Inc. (1996) for $ 114 million; Micro/Vest v. Computerland  (1985) for $125 
million; City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech (2002) for $200 million; Steel 
Software Systems Corp. v. First Union (2002) for $200 million; Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. 
v. American Financial Mortgage Corp. (2000) for $337.5 million; IGEN International  Inc v. Roche 
Diagnostics GmbH (2002) for $400 million.  
 These business-against-business cases involve allegations of large financial losses due to 
fraud or related reprehensible behavior. The most central point to be taken from these examples is 
that businesses do not seem to have reservations about asking for punitive damages when their 
financial interests are at stake. We can further ask, if punitive damages are acceptable for business 
disputes should they not be acceptable when individuals, or in many instances groups of 
individuals who have been harmed, sue businesses over products that have harmed them? 
 
Post-verdict Outcomes 
The McDonald’s case described above points to another often overlooked fact about punitive 
damages: the jury verdict is not the final word. The trial judge reduced the punitive award from $2.7 million 
to $480,000. The U.S. Supreme Court has told state courts that judges must review punitive award verdicts 
for fairness. Either trial judges or appellate courts review all the evidence to determine fairness and the 
awards are often reduced. 
W. Kip Viscusi, who is cited as an important authority in Jackpot Justice, concluded in his 
book, Reforming Products Liability, that plaintiffs in product liability cases received only 29 
percent of the original award. This is because “[c]ourts often reduce punitive damages on appeal, 
and defendants may negotiate a reduction …in return for prompt payment of the damages 
amount.” 67 Two other researchers, Karpoff & Lott, studied over 2000 cases involving punitive 




This discussion of products liability and punitive damages, like the medical malpractice 
issue, raises serious questions about the general, undocumented claims that appeal to widely 
available myths about the tort system. Again it is important to stress that there are substantial 
transactions costs in the tort system, but they occur on both sides.  What should be clear is that 
even businesses seem to believe that there are benefits that accrue from punitive damages 
litigation, since there are so many business-against-business disputes represented among the jury 
awards.    
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Background to This Report 
 
The present project was begun after one of the authors read Jackpot Justice and called it to the 
attention of the other two authors. We then contacted the American Association for Justice to ask if they 
were interested in sponsoring a report that critiqued Jackpot Justice. They were. The three authors received 
remuneration for their efforts. 
 
Because our critique of Jackpot Justice draws attention to heavy reliance on data that is proprietary 
and not peer reviewed, we went an extra step and arranged to have an earlier draft of our report critiqued 
by several reviewers under a procedure whereby they would remain anonymous to us (although those 
reviewers did know our identities). We are grateful for their constructive comments on that earlier draft. 
 
Finally, while our biographical summaries report our academic affiliations, this report and its 
conclusions are our own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of our respective institutions.   
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